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EX-ANTE PRICE COMMITMENT WITH
RENEGOTIATION IN A DYNAMIC MARKET
ADRIAN MASTERS AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
Abstract. This paper studies the endogenous determination of
the price formation procedure in markets characterized by match-
specific heterogeneity; such heterogeneity captures, for example,
markets in which sellers own differentiated commodities and buy-
ers have heterogeneous preferences. Specifically, we study a dy-
namic, stochastic model of a market in which, in each time period,
agents on one side (e.g., sellers) strategically choose whether or not
to “post”, or commit themselves to, incomplete price contracts be-
fore they encounter agents of the opposite type. After a pair of
agents of the opposite types have encountered each other, their
match-specific values from trading with each other are realised. If
no price contract was posted, then the terms of trade (and whether
or not it occurs) are determined by bilateral negotiations. Other-
wise, depending upon the agents’ match-specific trading values and
equilibrium continuation payoffs, trade occurs (if it does) either on
the terms specified in the posted contract or at a renegotiated price
(when renegotiation of the posted, incomplete price contract is mu-
tually beneficial). We study the Markov subgame perfect equilibria
of this market game, and address a variety of issues such as the
impact of market frictions on the equilibrium proportion of trades
that occur at a price specified in the ex-ante posted contract rather
than at a price determined by ex-post bargaining.
1. Introduction
The procedure (or mechanism) of price determination varies not only
across markets but often also within the same market. For example,
in housing markets, trade sometimes occurs at prices posted by sellers
and at other times at prices determined by bilateral negotiations; some
houses are even sold at auctions. In labour markets, firms often post
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wages, and, depending upon the nature of the “match” between a firm
and a worker, employment may occur either at the posted wage or
at a renegotiated wage (when renegotiation is mutually beneficial —
perhaps because the posted wage is too low while the worker has turned
out to be a good match for the firm). What factors determine the
procedure of price formation in any particular market? Under what
circumstances can two or more pricing mechanisms co-exist in the same
market? What role do market frictions play in determining the pricing
mechanism?
This paper aims to address these and other issues in the context
of frictional markets with match-specific heterogeneity. Such hetero-
geneity is meant to capture, for example, markets in which sellers own
differentiated commodities and buyers have heterogeneous preferences.
When embedded in the context of endogenous price determination, it
leads us to develop and explore a model that is quite different from the
other models in the relatively small literature that studies the endoge-
nous determination of the pricing mechanism.
The three main price formation procedures that are typically ob-
served in real-life, and that have received the most attention from eco-
nomic theorists are auctions, bargaining and price posting. A common
feature of the enormous literature on models of decentralized markets,
however, is that it takes the price formation procedure as exogenously
given. Following Vickrey (1961) there is a large literature on models
in which prices are determined via auctions; while following Diamond
(1981), Mortensen (1982), and, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) there
is vast literature on models in which prices are determined by bilat-
eral negotiations; and furthermore, following Diamond (1971) there is
a literature on models in which prices are determined by price posting.
In models that allow for a price posting mechanism there is a po-
tential, exogenously built-in ex-post inefficiency that arises from the
fact that when a pair of agents meet they have to either trade at some
convex combination of the two posted prices or not trade at all.1 This
implies that in an environment characterized by match-specific hetero-
geneity, it is possible that trade may not occur (since it might not be
individually rational for at least one of the two agents to trade at such a
price) although it might be mutually beneficial for the agents to trade
(but at some other price). Thus, ex-post renegotiation of the terms
of trade can be mutually beneficial. This is not surprising, since the
1This point also, it may be noted, applies to models in the literature following
Diamond (1971) in which prices are exogenously assumed to be determined via a
price posting mechanism — for two recent models in this literature, see Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) and Masters (1999).
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posted price is an incomplete (or, to be precise, non-comprehensive)
contract — in that the posted price is not conditioned on the poten-
tial match-specific realisations of the agents’ respective values from
trading with each other. A key novel feature of our market model is
that we allow for such mutually beneficial renegotiation to take place.
This price formation procedure may be called the contract posting cum
renegotiation mechanism.2
Another novel feature of our model is that we allow one side of the
market (e.g., sellers) to choose whether to determine the terms of trade
ex-post via a bilateral bargaining process, or to determine the terms
of trade via the contract posting cum renegotiation mechanism. As
indicated above, a main aim of this paper is to endogenously determine
the pricing mechanism as part of the market equilibrium.
As mentioned above, there is a relatively small literature that stud-
ies the endogenous determination of the pricing mechanism. Specifi-
cally, this literature studies market models that allow for two of the
three potential pricing mechanisms mentioned above. For example,
while Wang (1993), and, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) study models in
which the allowable pricing mechanisms are auctions and bargaining,
Peters (1991), Bester (1993), Wang (1995) and, Ellingsen and Rosen
(2003) — like us — allow for price posting and bargaining. They dif-
fer from ours in that they view these as distinct mechanisms to which
participants have to commit ex ante. Under our contract-posting-cum-
renegotiation-mechanism, whether the good is sold at a bargained or
a posted price will depend on the realized value of trade to the partic-
ipants.
In the next section we lay down the model, specify the equilibrium
concept, and, as an instructive benchmark, characterize the unique
equilibrium in the case when the posted price contracts are compre-
hensive — that is, the posted price is conditioned on the set of admis-
sible pairs of match-specific trading values. Thereafter, the analysis
concerns the set of equilibria under the more plausible case when the
posted price contracts are incomplete.
In section 3 we derive some general results concerning the character-
istics of an arbitrary market equilibrium. In particular, we shall show
that in any market equilibrium, the pricing mechanism will be the con-
tract posting cum renegotiation mechanism. Several results concerning
the impact of market frictions will also be derived here. One key insight
2Interestingly, over fifteen years ago, Hart and Moore (1988) established the
crucial role of mutually beneficial renegotiation in the context of an incomplete
bilateral contracting model — for recent surveys of that literature, see Hart (1995)
and Tirole (1999).
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obtained is that when the matching rates of the two sides of the mar-
ket are unequal, then aggregate market welfare would be maximised
either when the agents with the relatively higher matching rate post
incomplete price contracts or when the agents with the relatively lower
matching rate post comprehensive price contracts. In particular, the
posting of comprehensive price contracts by agents on the short side of
the market adversely affects aggregate market welfare.
The issue of the existence of market equilibrium is addressed in sec-
tion 4. Then, in sections 5 and 6 we derive — under various, alternative
additional assumptions — some further results concerning the proper-
ties of a market equilibrium such as the impact of market frictions on
the equilibrium proportion of trades that occur at the price specified in
the posted incomplete contract. A main insight obtained here is that
trade in markets with small frictions is likely to occur at negotiated
prices, while in markets with large frictions it is more likely to occur at
posted prices. An implication of this result — which appears to be con-
sistent with real-life retail markets — is that in retail markets in which
buyers search intensively (such as in housing markets) trade is more
likely to occur at negotiated prices, while in retail markets in which
their intensity of search is negligible (such as in the market for eggs)
trade is more likely to occur at prices posted by the sellers. Section 7
summarizes, and discusses some of our key modelling assumptions. We
relegate almost all of our technical arguments (formal proofs) to the
Appendix.
2. The Model
The market considered in the model operates over an infinite number
of discrete points in time with two types of agents, namely, “buyers”
and “sellers”, who are respectively denoted by type b and type s; there
are a large number (formally, a continuum) of each type of agent. The
market is in a steady state; that is, the numbers of buyers and sellers
in the market are constant over time.3
An important feature of this market is the existence ofmatch-specific,
payoff-relevant heterogeneity : the value to an agent from trading with
an agent of the opposite type depends on the nature of their specific
match. Agents of the opposite types encounter each other through
3As is noted in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, Part 2), such a steady state
assumption may be interpreted as an approximation for the case in which the
numbers of buyers and sellers are roughly constant, with any fluctuations being
small enough to be ignored by the agents.
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a random, pairwise matching process.4 After they meet, their match-
specific values are realised. The buyer’s and the seller’s values vb and vs
from trading with each other are randomly (and independently) drawn
from the distributions Fb and Fs respectively. Thus, if this pair of
agents agree to form a match, and trade at price p, then the buyer’s and
the seller’s payoffs are respectively vb−p and p+vs. We assume that Fk
(k = b, s) has a bounded support, denoted by Σk; the infimum and the
supremum of Σk are respectively denoted by vk and v¯k. For notational
convenience, we denote the Cartesian product of the supports, Σb×Σs,
by Σ. It will be assumed that v¯b + v¯s > 0; for otherwise no gains to
trade will exist between any pair of agents.
Unlike the vast majority of models of decentralized markets, in our
model each agent on one side of the market (either the sellers or the
buyers) will have the option (in each time period) to post a price con-
tract before encountering an agent of the opposite type (and hence,
before the realisation of any match-specific values). If that option is
not exercised by an agent, then the terms at which he trades are de-
termined ex-post — after he encounters an agent of the opposite type
and their match-specific values are realised — via a bilateral bargain-
ing process. This choice is formally equivalent to posting an extreme
price at which trade cannot be individually rational for any realized
valuations of the good.
For a number of reasons discussed at great length in the Theory
of Incomplete Contracts — see, for example, Hart (1995) and Tirole
(1999) — the posted price contracts may necessarily be incomplete
(or, more precisely, non-comprehensive); that is, the posted price may
not be conditioned on the set Σ of pairs of match-specific values. For
example, although the realised values vb and vs will be assumed to
be observable by both of the agents, it might be too costly for a third
party (such as the courts) to verify the realised values; as such a posted
price contract in which the price is contingent on the (ex-post) realised
values of vb and/or vs would be too costly to enforce. Our analysis
will therefore centre on the (plausible) case in which the posted price
contracts are incomplete, which gives rise to another key novel feature
of our model, to which we now turn.
4There is a growing literature on directed search with posted prices (e.g. Moen
1997). In such models, buyers, for example see all the prices at the same time but
which seller they approach is private information. Sellers have only one good to
sell each period so failure of buyers to coordinate means that some potential trades
are not realized. If agents are ex ante homogeneous (as in our model), symmetric
equilibria are characterized by random matching. This suggests that, our results
should be robust to allowing for directed rather than random search.
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Incompleteness of the posted price contract gives rise to the possi-
bility that for some realisations of the match-specific values there will
be room for mutually beneficial renegotiation of the price specified in
the posted contract. That is, although it will be mutually beneficial for
the agents who have encountered each other to form a match and trade
(given their match-specific realised values and given their equilibrium
payoffs from not trading), it would not be individually rational for at
least one of the agents to trade at the price specified in the posted
contract. In order to give agents the opportunity to exploit any po-
tential gains to trade that are realised ex-post (after they encounter
each other), we allow them the option to engage in mutually beneficial
renegotiation of the price specified in the posted contract.
The sequence of events that occur at each point in time t, where t =
0,∆, 2∆, . . ., with ∆ > 0 (but small), may be conveniently described
by the following five-stage process.
• Stage 1: Post a Price Contract? Each agent on one (and
only one) side of the market — sellers, for example — simultaneously
posts a price contract.5 If such a contract is comprehensive, then the
posted price contract is a function that specifies a price for each pair
(vb, vs) ∈ Σ. However, as has been argued above, such a contract
will typically be incomplete. In particular, the posted price contract
will specify one real number; this number denotes a price which is
independent of the match-specific pairs of agents’ values.6 We denote
the type of agents who have this option to post price contracts by i,
where i = b or i = s; the other type of agents is denoted by j (j 6= i).
• Stage 2: Random Pairwise Encounters. Each seller meets a
buyer with probability λs∆ < 1, and with the complement probability
1 − λs∆ the seller meets no one in this time period, where λs > 0
is a seller’s meeting rate.7 Similarly, each buyer meets a seller with
probability λb∆ < 1, and with the complement probability 1 − λb∆
the buyer meets no one in this time period, where λb > 0 is a buyer’s
meeting rate.8
5The consequences of allowing both sides of the market to post price contracts
is briefly discussed in the concluding section.
6It should be noted that posting a (constant) sufficiently high price or a suffi-
ciently low price is formally equivalent to not posting any price contract; the terms
of trade are (in such circumstances) always determined (at stage 4 below) through
a bilateral bargaining process.
7That is, each seller meets a buyer according to a Poisson process with parameter
λs. Similarly, each buyer meets a seller according to an independent Poisson process
with parameter λb.
8The price contracts posted at stage 1 have no influence on the meeting process
at stage 2. Indeed, the set of equilibria of our model are identical to the set of
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• Stage 3: Realisation of Match-Specific Values. After a pair
of agents of the opposite types encounter each other, their match-
specific values are realised. As mentioned above, we model this in
the following (standard) manner. The buyer’s and the seller’s values
vb and vs respectively from trading with each other are randomly (and
independently) drawn from the distributions Fb and Fs respectively.
It is assumed that these values become common knowledge amongst
them.9
• Stage 4: Renegotiation? The two agents now have the oppor-
tunity to decide whether or not to renegotiate the price specified in the
posted contract. They will renegotiate if and only if both agree to do
so — the decision to renegotiate is made simultaneously. If at least
one agent refuses to renegotiate, then the process moves to stage 5.
However, if both agents choose to renegotiate, then they engage in the
following bargaining process. With equal probability, Mother Nature
picks either agent to make an offer of a (new) price, which the other
agent can accept or reject. In either case the process then moves to
stage 5 (with a new agreed price, or the price specified in the posted
contract).10
• Stage 5: Trade? The two agents simultaneously decide whether
or not to form a match and trade.
Any agent who does not trade at time t waits until time t+∆ when
the five-stage process recurs. Furthermore, any pair of agents who trade
equilibria of the alternative model in which the contract posting process occurs
after the (random) meeting process. What is important is that contract posting
occurs before stage 3. The posted price contract is a legally enforceable contract. If
the agents agree to match, and trade occurs, then either agent can, if he wishes to,
enforce trade at the price specified in the posted contract. Neither party, however,
can enforce trade — which is voluntary (i.e., following Hart and Moore (1988)
amongst others, the posted contracts are at-will contracts).
9This is restrictive, but we focus here on other aspects of a problem that is
already rather rich. The role of this assumption — and others — is discussed in
the concluding section.
10Although unnecessarily complex to establish, all the results obtained in this
paper would also hold if, instead, we adopt the more plausible (Rubinsteinian)
infinite-horizon, alternating-offers process in which (i) the outcome associated with
perpetual disagreement (or impasse) is that trade (if it occurs) has to occur at
the posted price, and (ii) the players’ respective “costs” from rejecting offers (as
captured, for example, by their respective discount rates) are identical. This follows
from the result (established, for example, in Muthoo (1999, p.189)) that the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium of such a Rubinsteinian bargaining game is identical
to the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of our simple, randomly determined
proposer version of the “take-it-or-leave-it-offer” bargaining game in which each
party has an equal chance of being the proposer.
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at time t exit the market. The payoffs to an agent are as follows. If he
never trades — and thus stays in the market forever — then his payoff
is zero. But if he trades T time units after entering the market and
obtains z units of money, then his payoff is z exp(−rT ), where r > 0
denote’s the agents’ common discount rate.11
We should emphasize that the rules of renegotiation and trade de-
termination defined in stages 4 and 5 have been chosen to capture in
a simple, but rigorous manner the notion that the agents should have
the opportunity to tear-up the posted price contract and write a new
contract in order to consummate any ex-post realised gains to trade. In
particular, the objective is to capture the following plausible, specific
notions. Trade should be allowed to occur between a pair of agents
when it is mutually beneficial for them to trade (given their ex-post
realised values from trading with each other, and given their equilib-
rium payoffs from not trading with each other). Furthermore, if it is
individually rational for a pair of agents to trade at the price specified
in the posted contract then trade occurs at that price. On the other
hand, if it is not individually rational for some agent to trade at the
price specified in the posted contract, but trade is mutually beneficial,
then the agents should be allowed to tear-up the posted contract and
bargain over a new set of terms of trade, and trade at a renegotiated
price. One could certainly write alternative, perhaps more plausible
rules of renegotiation and trade determination that would also capture
these ideas.
2.1. The Equilibrium Concept. The model that we have described
above is, in effect, a stochastic, dynamic game with a continuum of
players. At any point in time, a continuum of agents (of type i) engage
in a simultaneous-move, contract posting process (as defined in stage
1). Subsequently, Nature determines a set of buyer-seller pairs, where
each such pair engages in a dynamic, strategic process (as defined in
stages 4 and 5). First, each pair simultaneously decide whether or
not to renegotiate the terms of trade specified in the posted contract.
Conditional on the outcome of that process, they may then engage in
a price renegotiation process. Finally, they then simultaneously decide
whether or not to trade.
We shall analyze the symmetric subgame perfect equilibria in Markov
pure strategies of this stochastic, dynamic game. In addition, we rule
out the use of weakly dominated strategies. A pure strategy for an
11Without loss generality, but in order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed
that the payoff to an agent who trades at time t is realised at the end of the time
period (i.e., at time t+∆).
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agent of either type (buyer or seller) is a complete plan of action, for
each and every eventuality the agent may find himself after entering
the market, and it can depend on the personal history of the agent in
arbitrary and complicated ways. A Markov (i.e., payoff-relevant) pure
strategy, on the other hand, has the property that the action of an
agent at any point in time t is independent of the history up until the
end of time period t−∆, but can be conditioned on events that occur
at time t. A Markov pure strategy for an agent of type k (k = b, s) is
denoted by σk.
Given the symmetric nature of our model, we shall characterize those
subgame perfect equilibria in which all buyers adopt the same Markov
pure strategy and all sellers adopt the same Markov pure strategy. A
symmetric (pure-strategy) Markov subgame perfect equilibrium is a
pair (σb, σs) of pure Markov strategies such that for an arbitrary agent
his equilibrium strategy (σb or σs, depending on whether the agent
is a buyer or a seller) is optimal at any point in the market game
given that all other buyers employ σb and all other sellers employ σs.
12
For convenience, we call a symmetric (pure-strategy) Markov subgame
perfect equilibrium (in which no agent employs a weakly dominated
strategy) a Market Equilibrium (ME, for short).
For any ME σ = (σb, σs), let Vb and Vs denote the associated equi-
librium expected payoffs to a buyer and a seller respectively at the
beginning of any time period t. The sum of these equilibrium payoffs
will capture some important properties of the ME, and therefore, for
notational convenience, we denote this sum, Vb + Vs, by R.
2.2. Equilibrium when Contracts are Comprehensive. As a use-
ful benchmark to the main case in which the posted price contracts are
incomplete, in this section we characterize the unique ME in the case
when the posted price contracts are comprehensive; that is, the posted
price is a function of the match-specific pair (vb, vs) of trading values.
Let pCi (.) denote such a comprehensive price contract posted by a type
i agent. It is first straightforward to show that in any ME the compre-
hensive posted price contract has the property that the type i agent
extracts all of the surplus from any match.13 Hence, it immediately
12It should be noted that by “optimal” we mean that he cannot profitably deviate
to an alternative strategy, Markovian or non-Markovian.
13That is, in any ME in the case when the posted price contract is comprehensive,
pCb (vb, vs) = Vs − vs and pCs (vb, vs) = vb − Vb — a formal proof of this result is
available upon request. This property makes much intuitive sense, since, by being
able to condition the posted price on the match-specific pair of trading values, the
type i agent can design the comprehensive price contract in such a way that for
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follows that in any ME, Vj = 0. Consequently, the Bellman equation
for Vi is:
(1) rVi = λi
∫∫
vi+vj≥Vi
[vi + vj − Vi]dFidFj.
Since the right-hand side of (1) is decreasing in Vi, it follows that there
exists a unique solution to (1) in Vi. Hence, we have established the
following result:
Lemma 1 (Comprehensive Posted Contracts). Fix i, where i = b or
i = s. In the case in which the posted price contracts are compre-
hensive, there exists a unique ME. In equilibrium, the comprehensive
posted price contract is
pCi (vb, vs) =
{
−vs if i = b
vb if i = s.
The equilibrium payoff to a type i agent is V Ci , where V
C
i is the unique
solution to (1), and the equilibrium payoff to a type j agent is V Cj = 0.
In equilibrium, trade between a buyer and a seller occurs if and only if
trade is mutually beneficial — that is, their match-specific pair of values
is such that vi+vj ≥ V Ci . Furthermore, trade always occurs at the price
specified in the equilibrium posted comprehensive price contract.
Notice that Lemma 1 is a statement of the Diamond Paradox for this
more general environment (cf. Diamond, 1971). It will, however, be
shown (in the next section) that the Diamond Paradox does not hold
when the posted price contracts are incomplete, provided that Fj is
non-degenerate.14
3. Characterization of Market Equilibria
We now begin our study of the main case in which the posted price
contracts are incomplete. In this section we derive several results con-
cerning the characteristics of an arbitrary ME. These results are general
to the extent that they are valid for any pair of distributions Fb and Fs
any realisation vj ∈ Σj , the type j agent is left indifferent between trading and not
trading at the appropriate price specified in such a contract.
14Not surprisingly, if Fj is degenerate, then the unique ME when posted contracts
are incomplete is (effectively) identical to the unique ME when posted contracts are
comprehensive. After all, if there is no variation in the type j agents’ trading value,
then it does not matter to the type i agents whether they can post comprehensive
or incomplete price contracts.
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with bounded supports. However, in view of the result stated above,
from now on we shall assume that the distribution Fj is non-degenerate
(i.e., v¯j > vj).
15
3.1. Preliminaries. The lemma stated below describes the circum-
stances under which in any ME a pair of agents will and will not rene-
gotiate, will and will not form a match and trade, and, if they match,
the terms of trade. The formal proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward,
and follows from standard arguments; as such it is omitted.
Lemma 2. Fix an arbitrary ME, and consider an arbitrary pair of
agents who have met (at any time t) such that at stage 1 the price
specified in the posted incomplete contract is p ∈ < and such that the
realised match-specific pair of values is (vb, vs) ∈ Σ. Then, in equilib-
rium:
(a) if vb + vs < Vb + Vs, then the agents do not trade,
(b) if vb − p ≥ Vb and p + vs ≥ Vs, then trade occurs at the price p
specified in the posted contract, and
(c) if vb + vs ≥ Vb + Vs and either (i) vb − p < Vb, or (ii) p+ vs < Vs,
then the agents renegotiate, and, trade at price Vs− vs with probability
one-half and at price vb − Vb with probability one-half.
Notice that Lemma 2(c) implies that if the “posted price” (i.e., the
price specified in the posted contract) is either arbitrarily high or arbi-
trarily low, then, for any realisation of the pair (vb, vs) ∈ Σ, the terms of
trade are determined by the bargaining process; the posted price has no
influence whatsoever on the terms of trade.16 Figure 1, which divides
the (vb, vs) space according to the four possible equilibrium outcomes
described in Lemma 2, may be useful when understanding the Bellman
equations for the players’ equilibrium expected payoffs, to which we
now turn.
Fix an arbitrary ME, and consider an arbitrary agent of type i (at any
time t) who has posted an arbitrary price contract p ∈ <. Using Lemma
2, we can now write his equilibrium expected payoff at the beginning
of stage 2, before the random meeting process occurs; we denote it
15We should emphasize that the results derived in this section are valid whether
Fi is degenerate or non-degenerate.
16Indeed, as mentioned above (in section 2), posting such a price contract is
formally equivalent to not posting any price contract. The type i agent has, effec-
tively, chosen not to post a price contract, but has chosen to determine the terms
of trade ex-post (after he encounters an agent of the opposite type) via a bilateral
bargaining process.


























vb = Vb + p
vs = Vs − p





Figure 1. An illustration of Lemma 2.
by Ẑi(p, Vb, Vs). However, it is first convenient to introduce some set
notation that partitions the (vb, vs) space appropriately. Define:
ΩN = {(vb, vs) ∈ Σ : vb + vs < Vb + Vs}
ΩP (p) = {(vb, vs) ∈ Σ : vb ≥ Vb + p and vs ≥ Vs − p}
ΩR(p) = {(vb, vs) ∈ Σ : vb + vs ≥ Vb + Vs and either vb < Vb + p or vs < Vs − p}.
Hence, after some simplification,








Zi(p, Vb, Vs) =
∫∫
(vb,vs)∈ΩP (p)











1 if i = b
−1 if i = s.
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Letting p∗i denote the equilibrium posted price, it follows (by definition)
that Vi = Ẑi(p
∗
















Furthermore, optimality requires that
(4) p∗i = argmax
p
Zi(p, Vb, Vs).
Finally, using similar arguments to those used above, it can be shown

















1 if j = s
−1 if j = b.
We have thus established the following characterization of the set of
Market Equilibria.
Proposition 1 (Characterization of Market Equilibria). Fix i and j,
where i, j = b, s with i 6= j. For any solution (Vi, Vj, p∗i ) to (3) − (5)
there exists a unique ME in which the equilibrium posted price contract
is p∗i and equilibrium expected payoffs to any agent of type i and any
agent of type j are respectively Vi and Vj. There exist no other ME.
3.2. Equilibrium Pricing Mechanism. Recall that type i agents
choose the mechanism through which the terms of trade are deter-
mined. In particular, a ME can be one of the following two types. A
ME in which the posted price is arbitrarily high (or arbitrarily low) has
the property that the terms of trade are always (for any possible pair
of match-specific values) determined via ex-post bargaining. On the
other hand, a ME in which the posted price is, what may be termed,
“serious” (in the sense that it is neither too low nor too high) has the
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property that at least some trades are executed at the ex-ante posted
price while others at an ex-post renegotiated price. In this subsection,
we establish that any ME is of the latter type.
It is useful to first introduce the concept of the agents’ “reservation”
values. In any ME, Rb and Rs —where Rb = Vb+p
∗
i and Rs = Vs−p∗i —
may be respectively interpreted as a buyer’s and a seller’s reservation
values. A buyer would like to trade with a seller at the equilibrium
posted price p∗i if and only if his realised value from trading vb ≥ Rb.
Similarly, a seller would like to trade with a buyer at the equilibrium
posted price p∗i if and only if his realised value from trading vs ≥ Rs.
Indeed, trade occurs at the equilibrium posted price p∗i if and only if
vb ≥ Rb and vs ≥ Rs. Otherwise trade occurs at a renegotiated price
or trade does not occur, depending on whether vb + vs ≥ Vb + Vs or
vb + vs < Vb + Vs.
Let Θ denote the set of ME. It is instructive to classify the set of
ME into the following subsets.17
ΘB = {(σb, σs) ∈ Θ : either v¯b < Rb or v¯s < Rs (but not both)}
ΘPR = {(σb, σs) ∈ Θ : v¯b ≥ Rb and v¯s ≥ Rs}.
For any ME σ ∈ ΘB, trade never occurs at the equilibrium posted
price — either because it is too high (v¯b < Rb) or because it is too low
(v¯s < Rs); it occurs at a negotiated price when gains to trade exist or
not at all when gains to trade do not exist. Proposition 2 below implies
that such a ME does not exist. This means that there does not exist a
ME in which the agents of type i post an arbitrarily high price (or an
arbitrarily low price) such that for all possible realisations (vb, vs) ∈ Σ,
the terms of trade are determined ex-post (after a pair of agents of the
opposite types meet each other) via bilateral bargaining. Proposition
2 states that Θ = ΘPR. Thus, in any ME the agents of type i will post
a price that is neither too high nor too low such that trade occurs at
it for at least some realisations of the match-specific values; for other
realisations it occurs at a renegotiated price or not at all (depending
on whether or not gains to trade exist).
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Pricing Mechanism). Fix i, where i = b
or i = s. If Fj is non-degenerate (i.e, v¯j > vj), then in any ME σ ∈ Θ,
v¯b > Rb and v¯s > Rs, where Rb = Vb + p
∗
i and Rs = Vs − p∗i .
Proof. In the Appendix. 
17Note that since v¯b + v¯s > 0 and (in any ME) v¯b + v¯s ≥ Vb + Vs, there cannot
exist a ME in which v¯b < Rb and v¯s < Rs.
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To capture the essence of the proof, suppose that i = b, and, contrary
to Proposition 2, that all buyers (such as firms in a labour market)
are posting an arbitrarily low price (wage) which is unacceptable to
all sellers (workers). In that case a firm and a worker split equally the
match surplus (when gains to trade exist) via bargaining. Now suppose
a firm unilaterally deviates and posts a wage equal to Vs− v¯s+, where
 > 0 but sufficiently small. It follows that there exist realisations of vs
(namely, vs ∈ [v¯s− , v¯s]
⋂
Σs) such that workers with such realisations
would (like the firm) be willing to trade at such a wage. Since such a
wage forces the worker down to (almost) his continuation payoff Vs, the
firm would (for such realisations) now get all the surplus — rather than
have to split it with the worker. The deviation is, therefore, profitable
for the firm.18
At first blush, this result may seem trivial. After all, by allowing
one side of the market to post price contracts (albeit incomplete) is
like granting them market power which they are bound to use. To
see why this result is interesting, consider once more Figure 1. For
realisations of (vb, vs) in the regions marked Part (c), the agents bargain
and any match surplus is divided equally. Within the region marked
Part (b), trade occurs at the posted price and the division of the surplus
depends on the actual realisation of the match-specific values vb and vs.
In particular, given a posted price p, realisations of (vb, vs) toward the
south-east of this region generates trade such that a seller would ex-
post regret having posted that price — he would receive less than half
the match surplus.19 The price posting decision amounts to picking a
location for the south-west corner of the Part (b) region on the vb+vs =
Vb+Vs line. The type i agent would like to minimize the probability of
outcomes that he would (ex-post) regret vis-a-vis those which he would
welcome. Proposition 2 implies that he can always find a (serious) price
at which the benefits from posting it outweigh the opportunity cost of
not bargaining.
Proposition 2 implies that in any ME, the equilibrium proportion
of trades which occur at the posted price (rather than at a renegoti-
ated price) is strictly positive, but (in general) it will be strictly less
18Thus, the contract posting cum renegotiation mechanism will be preferred by
the firms over the ex-post bargaining mechanism, precisely because it allows them
to extract a greater amount of surplus from some workers without affecting the
surplus that they obtain from the others. Without the possibility of mutually
beneficial renegotiation, this result may not hold.
19The converse is true for a buyer. Symmetrically, at that price, realisations
to the north-west of the Part (b) region would lead to trade at which the buyer
receives less than half the match surplus.
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than one. It is therefore interesting to study how various parameters
(such as those which capture market frictions) affect this equilibrium
proportion. Such an analysis may, in particular, shed some light on
the question of why in some markets trade typically occurs at posted
prices (such as in some retail markets), while in other markets it typ-
ically occurs at negotiated prices (such as in bazaars and some labour
markets). We shall address this issue in sections 5 and 6.
The result stated in the following corollary is a straightforward, im-
mediate consequence of Proposition 2. We therefore omit its formal
proof, and, instead provide some intuition for it after its statement.
Corollary 1. Fix i, where i = b or i = s. If Fj is non-degenerate (i.e.,
v¯j > vj), then in any ME, Vj > 0.
Corollary 1 implies that, unlike in the Diamond Paradox (and unlike
in the case of comprehensive contracting discussed above in section 2.2),
the type i agents do not receive all the match surplus. The intuition
behind this result comes partly from the observation that since price
contracts are incomplete, renegotiation of the price specified in the
equilibrium posted contract may occur for some (ex-post) realisations
of the match-specific values.
3.3. Role of Market Frictions. We now derive some results con-
cerning the role of the main parameters (namely, r, λb and λs) on
various aspects of an arbitrary ME. Our first result concerns the role
of the matching rates on aggregate market welfare. We define aggre-
gate market welfare to be the sum of the payoffs of all the agents in
the market (in a steady state). That is, aggregate market welfare is
W = VbNb+VsNs, where Nb and Ns are respectively the (steady state)
measures of buyers and sellers in the market. Since agents meet in
pairs, it must be the case that λbNb = λsNs. Hence, after normalizing






We now state our result concerning the role of the matching rates
on aggregate market welfare in the following proposition; it will be
discussed after its formal statement.
Proposition 3 (Matching Rates and Market Welfare). Assume that
Fj is non-degenerate (i.e., v¯j > vj); and, for each i = b, s, let W
C
i
denote the aggregate market welfare in the unique ME when the type i
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agents post comprehensive price contracts, and, let W Ii denote the ag-
gregate market welfare in an arbitrary ME when the type i agents post
incomplete price contracts.


















Proof. See Appendix. 
Thus, interestingly, when the matching rates are identical, aggre-
gate market welfare is the same whether the posted price contracts
are incomplete or comprehensive. Not surprisingly, though, it does
not matter which side of market gets to post the price contracts. It
should be noted, however, that the distribution of welfare between the
two sides of the market will crucially depend on whether contracts are
incomplete or comprehensive (cf. Lemma 1 and Corollary 1).
Another important result contained in Proposition 3 is that when
matching rates are not identical, the posting of comprehensive price
contracts by agents with the higher matching rate adversely affects
aggregate market welfare. The insight contained here is that when
one side of the market has too much bargaining power — by not only
being able to post comprehensive price contracts but also by having a
relatively higher matching rate — aggregate market welfare and market
efficiency is compromised. By making such agents post incomplete
price contracts (with the crucial option to engage in mutually beneficial
renegotation), on the other hand, gives some bargaining power to the
other side of the market which has a lower matching rate.
A more general insight that one may extract from Proposition 3
is that the distribution of bargaining power amongst market traders
has efficiency consequences. In particular, a social planner with an
objective to maximise aggregate market welfare would not allow agents
on the short-side of the market (i.e., agents who have the relatively
higher matching rate) to post comprehensive price contracts. It may
be worth noting that this insight suggests a potential explanation for
the existence of incomplete contracts — namely, that such contracts
help distribute bargaining power more evenly amongst the concerned
parties.
It should be noted that Proposition 3 implies that aggregate mar-
ket welfare would be maximised either (i) when the agents with the
relatively higher matching rate post incomplete price contracts or (ii)
when the agents with the relatively lower matching rate post compre-
hensive price contracts. We have not been able to establish whether it
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is the former or the latter that generates the higher aggregate market
welfare.
The next proposition concerns the role of the matching rates on each
agent’s equilibrium payoff.
Proposition 4 (Matching Rates and Equilibrium Payoffs). Fix i, where
i = b or i = s. If Fj is non-degenerate, then in any ME, if λi ≥ λj
then Vi > Vj, and, if λi < λj and the difference λj − λi is not too large
then (also) Vi > Vj.
Proof. See Appendix. 
The results stated in this proposition follow since a type i agent
extracts a relatively greater amount of surplus from some type j agents
(i.e., for some realisations of vj) by trading at the equilibrium posted
price. Not surprisingly, the ability to post an incomplete price contract
(even with the possibility of mutually beneficial renegotiation) gives a
type i agent a relatively greater equilibrium payoff. And, this is valid
even when there are far more agents of that type than agents of the
opposite type in the market (which is captured by having λj > λi).
When the discount rate is arbitrarily small (close to zero), the mar-
ket contains negligible frictions. The result contained in the following
proposition addresses, in particular, this limiting case of negligible mar-
ket frictions.
Proposition 5 (Discount Rate and Sum of the Equilibrium Payoffs).
Fix i, where i = b or i = s. If Fj is non-degenerate, then in any ME,
the sum R of the equilibrium payoffs to a pair of agents of the opposite
types is strictly decreasing in r. Furthermore, R → v¯b + v¯s as r → 0,
and, R→ 0 as r →∞.
Proof. In the Appendix. 
As would be expected, aggregate market welfare increases as the de-
gree of market frictions decreases. In particular, Proposition 5 implies
that when market frictions are negligible, in any ME, trade occurs be-
tween a buyer and a seller if and only if the realised match-specific pair
of values (vb, vs) are arbitrarily close to the pair (v¯b, v¯s). This makes
intuitive sense; when frictions are negligible, the cost to each agent of
locating the almost perfect match is negligible — and therefore, each
agent waits to match with an agent of the opposite type who will gen-
erate almost maximal value for him.
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At this level of generality, we have not been able to derive the limiting
(as r → 0) equilibrium payoffs to a type i agent and a type j agent.
However, the specific case studied in section 5 below suggests that in
general, when market frictions are negligible and the matching rates
are identical, a type i agent will obtain a relatively greater equilibrium
payoff. Thus, even under almost frictionless conditions, the ability
to post price contracts (subject to mutually beneficial renegotiation)
may confer a strategic advantage. This observation suggests that when
market frictions are negligible, the ME outcome may not approximate
the “competitive” equilibrium outcome of our market.
4. Existence of Market Equilibria
It has proved difficult to establish the existence of a ME without
imposing some additional restrictions on the distributions Fi and Fj.
We have established three existence results, two of which are fairly
general.
Our first existence result (Proposition 6(a) below) assumes that Fi
and Fj are continuous. However, this result requires assuming that a
type i agent can randomize over the choice of his posted price contract.
It has not been possible to establish existence of a ME (in this, general
case) without allowing for such mixed strategies.
Our second existence result (Proposition 6(b) below) assumes that
Fi is degenerate; this assumption considerably simplifies the equations
that characterize a ME, but without any loss in the main strategic con-
siderations that underlie our market model. In addition, this existence
result requires some appropriate restrictions on Fj, which, in fact, suf-
fice for the existence of a unique ME. This ME is in pure strategies.
The assumption that Fi is degenerate — that is, v¯i = vi — means that
the value to a type i agent from trading is the same across all type j
agents; we denote this single value by v∗i .
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Our third, and final existence result (Proposition 6(c) below) is for
the case when Fi and Fj are uniformly distributed.
Proposition 6 (Existence of Market Equilibria). Fix i, where i = b
or i = s.
(a) If Fi and Fj are continuous, then there exists a (mixed-strategy)
ME.
(b) If Fj is differentiable, 1 − Fj is log-concave, and Fi is degenerate
20It may be noted that the assumption that Fi is degenerate captures many
kinds of markets such as some retail markets (or bazaars) in which sellers post
prices, and, each seller does not care as to which particular buyer she trades with.
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(i.e., v¯i = vi), then there exists a unique (pure-strategy) ME.
(c) If both Fi and Fj are uniformly distributed, then there exists a
unique (pure-strategy) ME.
Proof. The proofs of parts (a) and (b) are in the Appendix. The proof
of part (c) is straightforward (although algebraically messy), and hence
it is omitted.21 
For part (b) of this proposition, it may be noted that while differ-
entiability of Fj is assumed to simplify the arguments (and could be
dispensed with), log-concavity of 1−Fj is crucial to our argument, and,
it may be noted, it is an assumption often used for the existence of a
pure-strategy equilibrium. In the context of our model under the addi-
tional assumption that Fi is degenerate, it also suffices for establishing
the uniqueness of equilibrium.
5. An Example: The Case of Uniform Distributions
In order to obtain some additional insights concerning the properties
of the Market Equilibria, over and above those obtained in section 3
above, we now study the unique ME when both Fi and Fj are uniformly
distributed.22 Although the results discussed here are specific to this
case, the intuition behind them suggest that some (but certainly not
all) of these results may actually hold more generally. There are several
issues of interest that we wish to obtain some insight into, but which
we were unable to do in the general context studied in section 3 above.
In particular, the issue of the impact of market frictions on (i) the
equilibrium proportion of trades that occur at the posted price, and
(ii) the equilibrium payoffs to type i and type j agents.
In this section (only) we assume, without loss of generality, that
i = b. That is, it is the buyers who get to post the incomplete price
contracts. This assumption fits, for example, labour markets in which
firms (the buyers) post wages (prices).
Although it is possible to obtain a closed-form, analytical charac-
terization of the unique ME for any set of parameters, we have done
so only when the discount rate is sufficiently small. In that case we
obtain several insightful results, which we report in the following propo-
sition.23 They will be discussed after we state this proposition and after
we report the results of a simulation aimed to obtain insights into the
properties of the unique ME for larger values of the discount rate.
21It is available upon request.
22Recall that Proposition 6(b) states that in this case, there exists a unique ME.
23A proof of this proposition is available upon request.
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Proposition 7 (The Case of Uniform Distributions). If i = b, and,
both Fb and Fs are uniformly distributed, then the unique ME possesses,
in particular, the following properties. There exists an r¯ such that over
the interval (0, r¯), a change in the discount rate r has in general an
ambiguous effect on the equilibrium posted price. However, if λb = λs,
then the equilibrium posted price is strictly decreasing in r; but if λs is
sufficiently larger than λb, then the equilibrium posted price is strictly
increasing in r. Moreover, the equilibrium proportion of trades which
occur at the posted price — we denote this proportion by τ — equals
1/3 for any r ∈ (0, r¯). For any r > r¯, τ is strictly increasing in r.
Before we discuss the results stated in this proposition, we first re-
port the results of a simulation that reveals, in particular, a few other
interesting properties of the unique ME for larger values of the discount
rate, but when the matching rates are identical.24 The results of the
simulation in question are stated in Table 1. As is evident, the results
of this simulation are consistent with the appropriate, analytically de-
rived results stated in Proposition 7 above. There are, however, some
other revealing results in this simulation that we have not been able
to establish analytically. For example, as can be seen from Table 1,
the difference Vb − Vs does not vanish as r becomes negligible. This
result is particularly interesting as it implies (and this was mentioned
in our discussion above following Proposition 5) that our ME outcome
does not approximate the “competitive” equilibrium outcome even as
market frictions become negligible.25 The message here is that even
under frictionless conditions, the option to post price contracts (albeit
incomplete, and, given the possibility to engage in mutually beneficial
renegotiation) confers a strategic advantage.
A key intuition that underlies all of these results runs as follows.
When the matching rates are identical, then the only asymmetry be-
tween a firm (a buyer) and a worker (a seller) is that the firm has the
option to post a price contract, which works to its advantage; in par-
ticular, the greater the degree of market frictions (i.e., the higher the
value of r) the bigger is that advantage. This is because the worker’s
“outside option” — which is to wait and find an alternative trading
partner — is less attractive the greater the degree of market frictions.
However, when a worker’s matching rate is sufficiently large relative to
24The model was simulated, with most of the results to be shortly discussed
captured also in the several other simulations that we conducted but which we
shall not report here.
25In a “competitive” equilibrium outcome of our market, all agents would earn
the same expected payoff.
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r R pb Vb Vs τ
.001 14.2 4.22 9.15 5.05 0.33
0.01 13.3 3.93 8.71 4.59 0.41
0.1 10.9 2.45 8.22 2.68 0.78
0.2 9.69 1.87 7.82 1.87 0.9
0.3 8.86 1.47 7.39 1.47 0.91
0.4 8.21 1.22 6.99 1.22 0.97
0.5 7.67 1.00 6.67 1 1
Table 1. Results of a simulation: Equilibrium when Fb
and Fs are uniformly distributed, λb = λs = 1, v¯s = 1,
vs = 0, v¯b = 14 and vb = 8.
a firm’s matching rate, the worker’s outside option is relatively more
attractive than the firm’s outside option, and this works to the worker’s
advantage. Hence, for example, when λs is sufficiently larger than λb,
the equilibrium posted price is strictly increasing in r.
As can be seen from Table 1, when the matching rates are identical,
both Vb and Vs are strictly decreasing in r. Furthermore, the ratio
Vb/Vs increases with the discount rate. This result indicates that the
relative advantage that type i agents have over type j agents increases
with the degree of market frictions.
Although the result established in Proposition 7 that τ , the equi-
librium proportion of trades at the posted price, is constant for small
values of r may not be robust to other specifications of the distribu-
tions, the result that τ is (in general) increasing in r will be shown (in
the next section) to hold under a more general class of distributions.
Thus, a key insight from our model may be put as follows: trade in
markets with small frictions is likely to occur at negotiated prices, while
in markets with large frictions it is more likely to occur at posted prices.
Let us provide some intuition behind this insight.
To illustrate the intuition in a fairly transparent manner, let us con-
sider the two extreme cases of very large and very small degrees of
market friction. In the former case, waiting to find an alternative trad-
ing partner is quite costly, and thus, the agents’ outside options are
pretty unattractive. This immediately implies that trade at the posted
price will tend to be individually rational for any pair of agents. In the
latter case, on the other hand, the reverse holds: the outside options of
both agents are pretty attractive, and thus, trade at the posted price
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will tend not to be individually rational for at least one them. Hence,
trade is more likely to occur at an ex-post negotiated price.
In most retails markets in the rich, OECD countries, trade typically
always occurs at posted prices. On the other hand, in retail markets in
the relatively poorer, developing countries (such as India), buyers typi-
cally trade at an ex-post negotiated price (and not at the sellers’ posted
prices). We argue that this casual observation can be potentially ex-
plained by differences in the degree of market frictions — and appealing
to the insight obtained above — since the value of time (or subjective
discount rate) of buyers in the rich, OECD countries is typically larger
than that of buyers in the poorer, developing countries.26
6. No Variation in Type i Agents’ Value
In this section we study the unique ME under the hypothesis of
Proposition 6(b). We should emphasize that the assumption that Fi is
degenerate considerably simplifies the equations which characterize a
ME, without any loss in the main strategic considerations that underlie
our market model (since, in particular, we continue to assume that Fj
is almost arbitrary, but non-degenerate). The assumption that Fi is
degenerate, it may be noted, captures many kinds of markets such as
some retail markets (or bazaars) in which sellers post prices, and, each
seller does not care as to which particular buyer she trades with.
Our main objective here is, in particular, to explore the robustness
or otherwise of the results obtained above (in the context of uniform
distributions) concerning the role of the main parameters on the equi-
librium proportion of trades which occur at the posted price. Since the
(general) results obtained in section 3 are valid when Fi is degenerate,
there is no point reproducing such results here when Fi is explicitly
assumed to be degenerate. We shall only derive results on key issues
that proved difficult to obtain in the general case (without the added
assumption of Fi being degenerate).
6.1. Equilibrium Trade. Here we examine how the parameters affect
the equilibrium probability of trade between an arbitrary pair of agents.
26We are not suggesting for a moment that in all matters and all spheres of life,
individuals in the rich, OECD countries are more impatient than individuals in the
poorer, developing countries. In some matters, the reverse is the case. However,
when acting as buyers in retail markets — such as when buying food or consumer
durables — the richer individual is relatively more impatient to buy and leave the
market as he has relatively less time at hand for shopping. In contrast, when acting
as workers in labour markets, individuals in the rich, OECD countries are far less
impatient to trade; as such posted wages are often renegotiated.
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This probability is, of course,
γ = 1− Fj(R− v∗i ),
where R = Vi + Vj. For simplicity of calculation, we shall assume that
λb = λs = λ; and denote r/λ by r̂. We obtain the following result:
Lemma 3 (Equilibrium Probability of Trade). Fix i, where i = b or
i = s. Assume that Fj is differentiable, 1 − Fj is log-concave, Fi is
degenerate (v¯i = vi = v
∗
i ), and, λb = λs = λ. For any parameter values
such that R > v∗i + vj (where R = Vi + Vj), the equilibrium probability
of trade γ is strictly increasing in r̂ (where r̂ = r/λ), and it is also
strictly increasing in v∗i .
Proof. In the Appendix. 
Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, the equilibrium probability of trade
between an arbitrary pair of agents increases with the degree of market
frictions and with the expected total value of a match.27 An implica-
tion of this result is that a proportional mean preserving spread of Fj
generates a reduced rate of trading.
Proposition 5 implies that R is strictly decreasing in r̂, with R→ 0
as r̂ → ∞, and R → v∗i + v¯j as r̂ → 0. These results imply that
the comparative-static results stated in Lemma 3 are valid for any
parameter values when v∗i + vj ≤ 0. But if v∗i + vj > 0, then, when r̂
is sufficiently large, R < v∗i + vj (i.e., R < v
∗
i + vj for any vj ∈ Σj).
Hence, when r̂ is sufficiently large, the equilibrium probability of trade
equals one. Indeed, this makes intuitive sense: when the degree of
market frictions is sufficiently large, the equilibrium payoffs to any
pair of agents from not trading (and thus, waiting to find an alternative
trading partner) will be so small that they will always (for any vj ∈ Σj)
find it mutually beneficial to trade with each other.
6.2. Equilibrium Proportion of Trades at the Posted Price. We
now explore how the parameters affect the equilibrium proportion of
trades which occur at the posted price (rather than at a renegotiated
price). Let τ denote this proportion; thus, 1−τ denotes the proportion
of trades that occur at a renegotiated price. In the unique ME, trade
occurs at the posted price for any vj ∈ [Rj, v¯j], and at a renegotiated
price for any vj ∈ [R−v∗i , Rj], where Rj is a type j agent’s equilibrium
27It may be noted that in terms of the pattern of trade, changes in v∗i are identical
to changes in the expected value of vj .
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reservation value and R = Vi+Vj. Furthermore, for any vj ∈ [vj, R−v∗i ]
trade does not occur (since it is not mutually beneficial to do so). Thus,
(7) τ =
1− Fj(Rj)





We obtain the following result:
Proposition 8 (Equilibrium Trade at the Posted Price). Fix i, where
i = b or i = s. Assume that Fj is differentiable, 1− Fj is log-concave,
Fi is degenerate (v¯i = vi = v
∗
i ), and, λb = λs = λ.
(a) The derivative of τ with respect to r̂ is in general ambiguous, where
r̂ = r/λ. If, however, v∗i + vj > 0, then there exists a r̂
∗ and r̂∗∗ where
r̂∗ > r̂∗∗ > 0 such that over the interval (r̂∗∗, r̂∗), τ is strictly increasing
in r̂, and, τ = 1 for all r̂ > r̂∗.
(b) The derivative of τ with respect to v∗i is in general ambiguous.






i > 0 such that over
the interval (v˜∗i , v̂
∗
i ), τ is strictly increasing in v
∗




Proof. In the Appendix. 
The intuition for why the comparative-static results reported in the
proposition above are in general ambiguous is because changes in the
appropriate parameters have the same qualitative effect on both the
denominator of the RHS of (7) — which is the equilibrium probability
of trade — and on the numerator of the RHS of (7) — which is the
equilibrium probability of trade at the posted price. We now discuss
the other results contained in Proposition 8.
An implication of the result in part (a) of the proposition is — as,
indeed, we also discovered in the context of the case of uniform distri-
butions in section 5 above — that trade in markets with relatively small
frictions is more likely to occur at negotiated prices, while in markets
with relatively large frictions it is more likely to occur at posted prices.
This result makes much sense, and the intuition for it was provided
in section 5. On the other hand, the appropriate result in part (b)
of the proposition is at first blush seemingly inconsistent with real-life
markets. The result implies that trade in retail markets for expen-
sive items (such as cars and houses) should be more likely to occur at
posted prices, while in retail markets for relatively cheap items (such
as foodstuffs) trade is more likely to occur at negotiated prices.
As we now explain in the context of retail markets, the reason for
why our model generates this counter-intuitive relationship between the
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equilibrium proportion of trades at the posted price and the expected
total value of a match is because in our model the matching rate (or
equivalently the intensity of search) is exogenously given.
Notice that an implication of the result (contained in Proposition
8(a)) is that (when the matching rate is sufficiently small) the equi-
librium proportion of trades at the posted price is strictly decreasing
in the matching rate. Since the matching rate is determined by the
intensity with which buyers search for sellers, this result implies that
the more intensively buyers engage in search the more likely it is that
trade occurs at negotiated prices. But casual observation suggests that
in real-life, retail market buyers tend to search intensively when buying
an expensive item (such as a car or a house) and not when buying cheap
items (such as foodstuffs). This is because it is hardly more costly to
find another auto dealership than it is to find another supermarket.
Accordingly, a simple extension of the model (which goes beyond the
scope of the current paper) would be to endogenize search intensity.
With search costs fixed, agents will search more intensively for larger
ticket items inducing a higher proportion of trades at bargained prices.
We now draw attention to another implication of the appropriate
result contained in Proposition 8(b). In the context of labour markets,
suppose that firms are posting wages, and that the variance of the dis-
tribution of a worker’s match-specific value decreases. Since a decrease




follows immediately from Proposition 8(b) that as the variance of Fj
decreases, the equilibrium proportion of trades at the posted price will
increase. This makes intuitive sense. That is partly because as the
variability in vj decreases, the likelihood that trade at the posted wage
is individually rational for both parties increases. And partly because
as the variability in vj decreases, after having encountered some firm,
a worker’s incentive to search for an alternative firm decreases, since
the likelihood of her obtaining a better match-specific value has de-
creased. In the context of retail market, this result suggests that when
comparing 2 items of similar expected value, such as painting and com-
puter, the item over which the idiosyncratic component of value has
greater variance is more likely to be sold at a bargained price (i.e. the
painting).
28This is because an increase in v∗i is equivalent to an increase in the expected
value of vj , which, in turn, is equivalent (after normalization) to keeping the ex-
pected value of vj unchanged but decreasing the variance of vj .
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7. Summary and Concluding Remarks
The two most fundamental results obtained in this paper — con-
cerning markets characterized by match-specific heterogeneity — are
as follows:
• In such markets, some trades are executed at posted prices, while
others at negotiated prices — with the exact proportions depending on
the fundamentals such as the degree of market frictions. In particular,
trade in markets with small frictions is likely to occur at negotiated
prices, while in markets with large frictions it is more likely to occur at
posted prices. This implies, for example, that in retail markets in which
buyers search intensively (such as in housing markets) trade is more
likely to occur at negotiated prices, while in retail markets in which
their intensity of search is negligible (such as in the food market) trade
is more likely to occur at posted prices.
• In general (when the numbers of sellers and buyers are unequal, or
equivalently when the matching rates are unequal) the posting of com-
prehensive price contracts by agents on the short-side of the market
adversely affects aggregate market welfare; a social planner, for exam-
ple, would not allow agents on the short-side of the market to post
comprehensive price contracts. To put it differently, when one side of
the market has too much bargaining power — by not only being able
to post comprehensive price contracts but also by having a relatively
higher matching rate — aggregate market welfare is compromised. Ag-
gregate market welfare is maximised either when the agents with the
relatively higher matching rate post incomplete price contracts or when
the agents with the relatively lower matching rate post comprehensive
price contracts. Thus, in order to promote aggregate market welfare
it is important that bargaining power, broadly interpreted, is evenly
distributed between the two sides of the market.
Another point that deserves some emphasis is:
• When contracts are incomplete (as they typically are), the Dia-
mond paradox should not be of concern in such markets (provided, of
course, that the heterogeneity is not degenerate). However, with regard
to the other side of the same coin, such markets will not be Walrasian
even in the limit as market frictions vanish; the price-posting agents
will always retain some positive degree of market power.
Although our market model is the first to combine in a single frame-
work (of endogenous price determination) the triple features of (i)
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match-specific heterogeneity, (ii) the option to post incomplete price
contracts, and (iii) the option to engage in mutually beneficial renego-
tiation, the model contains some restrictive, simplifying assumptions.
We conclude by considering some of them.
One such is the assumption that when a pair agents of the opposite
types encounter each other, their match-specific trading values become
common knowledge between them. This assumption ought to be re-
laxed in future research, since it is far more plausible that after a pair of
agents encounter each other, the realisation of type k agent’s (k = b, s)
match-specfic value vk is his private information. A potential way to
extend our model in order to incorporate the consequences of such
private information would be to introduce another stage to the game
that takes place after stage 3 and before stage 4. In that (new) stage,
stage 3.5 say, the matched agents simultaneously announce their trad-
ing values. Of course, each agent may have an incentive to lie about
his trading value. For example, suppose that a buyer’s true realised
value is sufficiently high such that it is individually rational for him to
trade at the posted price but he would then get less than half of the
match surplus if trade occurred at the posted price. In that circum-
stance, he would have an incentive to announce a relatively lower value
in order to induce renegotiation of the posted price (and thus obtain
half the match surplus). The analysis of such an extended model would
not be trivial, but it would be worth pursuing in order to address the
robustness or otherwise of the main results obtained in this paper.
Second, although the assumption that only one side of the market has
the option to post price contracts may have merit from an applicability
point of view — since it is consistent with several real-life markets — it
is interesting and important from a theoretical perspective to give both
sides of the market this option; and thus, to endogenously determine (as
part of a market equilibrium) the conditions and circumstances under
which only one side exercises such an option. This extended model
would provide much insight and understanding about the workings of
real-life markets where only one side posts incomplete price contracts.
When extending our model to capture this feature, it may be assumed,
for example, that when both types of agents post prices, pb and ps,
then, when deciding whether or not to renegotiate, and whether or not
to trade, the “default” price is p = (pb+ps)/2 if pb ≥ ps. But if pb < ps
then there is no default price — which means that in that case, trade
can only occur at an ex-post negotiated price.
Third, it would be interesting to extend our model by allowing the
trading value to be partly match-specific, but also partly endogenous
— as a function of some investment decision. That is, the value vk to
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a type k agent from trading with some particular type m agent (m 6=
k) is a function fk(θk, Ik), where θk is the match-specific component
(randomly realised after encountering this particular agent), while Ik is
his investment level made upfront before encountering any agent. Such
an extended model could also be interpreted from the perspective of the
incomplete bilateral contracting literature: unlike in that literature, in
such a model the parties’ “outside options” would now be endogenously
determined as part of a market equilibrium.
Fourth, the assumption that the intensities with which agents search
is exogenous should be relaxed. As we informally discussed in section
6.2 above, such an extended model is necessary in order to obtain the
plausible relationship between the equilibrium proportion of trades that
occur at posted prices (vis-a-vis negotiated prices) and the expected
total value of a match. This is because as the expected total value of a
match increases, it is intuitive that agents in real-life markets increase
their intensity of search — which (using the results obtained in this
paper) would imply an increase in the likelihood of trade occuring at
negotiated prices (rather than at posted prices).
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix i, where i = b or i = s, and fix an
arbitrary ME σ ∈ Θ. We first establish, by contradiction, that v¯b + v¯s >
Vb + Vs. Thus, suppose that v¯b + v¯s ≤ Vb + Vs. This would imply that
ΩN = Σ and ΩP (p∗i ) = ΩR(p
∗
i ) = ∅. Hence, it follows from (3) and (5) that
Vb = Vs = 0. This implies that v¯b + v¯s ≤ 0, which is a contradiction. We
note that v¯b + v¯s > R implies that Vs − v¯s < v¯b − Vb, where R = Vb + Vs.
Define, for each  ∈ [0, v¯b + v¯s −R],
pi() =
{
Vs − v¯s +  if i = b
v¯b − Vb −  if i = s.
The following Claim implies that Vs− v¯s < p∗i < v¯b−Vb, which, in turn (and
as required), implies Proposition 2.
Claim A.1. There exists an  ∈ (0, v¯b+v¯s−R) such that Zi(pi(), Vb, Vs) >
Zi(p, Vb, Vs) for any p ≥ v¯b − Vb and for any p ≤ Vs − v¯s.
Proof of Claim A.1. If p is such that either p ≥ v¯b − Vb or p ≤ Vs − v¯s,
then ΩP (p) = ∅, which (using (2)) implies that for any such p,










Notice that for any such p, Zi(p, Vb, Vs) is independent of p — since for any
such p the terms of trade are determined (for any possible realisation of vb
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and vs) ex-post via bilateral bargaining; the posted price p is redundant.
Furthermore, using (2), we obtain that


























For notational convenience, define Gi() = 2[Zi(pi(), Vb, Vs)−Zi(p, Vb, Vs)].





vb + vs −R
2
)







(vi + v¯j −R− )− [vj − (v¯j − )]
]
dFbdFs.
Thus, for any  ∈ [0, v¯b + v¯s −R],
Gi() = −Ψ′j(v¯j − )Ψi(R− v¯j + ) + Ψj(v¯j − )Ψ′i(R− v¯j + ),








It may be noted that Ψ′x(z) = −[1− Fx(z)].
Since Ψ′x(z) = −[1−Fx(z)], and for any  > 0, Ψj(v¯j−) < [1−Fj(v¯j−)],
it follows that for any  ∈ (0, v¯b + v¯s −R],
Gi() > [1− Fj(v¯j − )][Ψi(R− v¯j + ) + Ψ′i(R− v¯j + )].
We now show that there exists an ¯i, where 0 < ¯i < v¯b + v¯s − R, such
that for any  ∈ (0, ¯i) the right-hand side of the above inequality is strictly
positive — which implies that Gi() > 0, as required.
Let hi() = Ψi(R − v¯j + ) + Ψ′i(R − v¯j + ). Since (by definition) Fi is
right-continuous, it follows that hi is right-continuous at  = 0. Now notice
(since v¯b + v¯s > R) that hi(0) > 0. It thus follows that there exists an ¯i
(where 0 < ¯i < v¯b + v¯s − R) such that for any  ∈ (0, ¯i), hi() > 0. The
desired result follows immediately, since for any  > 0, 1− Fj(v¯j − ) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. For each i = b, s, let RCi denote the sum
of the equilibrium payoffs to a pair of agents of the opposite types in the
unique ME when the type i agents post comprehensive price contracts, and,
let RIi denote the sum of the equilibrium payoffs to a pair of agents of the
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opposite types in an arbitrary ME when the type i agents post incomplete
price contracts.
First suppose that λb = λs. It follows from Claim A.2 below that RIb = R
C
b
and RIs = R
C
s . Part (a) of the proposition now follows immediately since
(by Lemma 1) RCb = R
C
s , and since (when the matching rates are identical)
aggregate market welfare W equals one-half of the sum of the payoffs to a
pair of agents of the opposite types.
Now we establish part (b) of the proposition. Thus, now suppose that






























[vb + vs −RCb ]dFbdFs,










[vb + vs −RIb ]dFbdFs.
Hence, since the integral ∫∫
vb+vs≥R
[vb + vs −R]dFbdFs
is strictly decreasing in R, and since Claim A.2 below implies that RIb > R
C
b ,
it therefore follows that W Ib < W
C
b . By a symmetric argument, since Claim
A.2 implies that RIs < R
C





Claim A.2. Fix i, where i = b, s. If Fj is non-degenerate, then in any
ME
RIi T RCi if λi S λj .









[vb + vs −R]dFbdFs,
where R = Vb + Vs. Now define k = λj/λi. After substituting for λj (using











[vb + vs −R]dFbdFs − rR.
Proposition 1, of course, implies that in any ME, Vj and R must satisfy
(10). Now notice that it follows from Lemma 1 that RCi is the unique value
of R such that ξ(R) = 0. Furthermore, note that since the first term of ξ(.)
is strictly decreasing in R, it follows that ξ(.) is strictly decreasing in R.
Given these properties of ξ, it is now trivial to establish Claim A.2. First
note that if k = 1 then it follows from (10) that in any ME, ξ(R) = 0; hence,
RIi = R
C
i . Secondly, note that if k < 1 then — since in any ME, Vj > 0
(cf. Corollary 1) — it follows from (10) that in any ME, ξ(R) > 0; hence,
RIi < R
C




Proof of Proposition 4. In order to establish this proposition,
we first need to derive Claim A.3 (stated below) that provides an alterna-
tive characterization of the set of ME. It then follows by subtracting (12)
from (11) — stated below in Claim A.3 — that the difference between the
equilibrium payoffs (in any ME)






where R and Ĝi(R) are defined below in Claim A.3. Proposition 4 is now
an immediate consequence of the observation that Ĝi(R) > 0 and R > 0.
Claim A.3. Fix i and j, where i, j = b, s with i 6= j. (Vi, Vj , p∗i ) defines
















Vs − v¯s + ∗b if i = b
v¯b − Vb − ∗s if i = s,




Φi(R) = {∗i : Gi(∗i ;R) ≥ Gi(;R) ∀ ∈ [0, v¯b + v¯s −R]}, where
(13) Gi(;R) = −Ψ′j(v¯j − )Ψi(R− v¯j + ) + Ψj(v¯j − )Ψ′i(R− v¯j + )
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(14)











λiΨj(v¯j − ∗i )Ψ′i(R− v¯j + ∗i )
r
+
λjΨ′j(v¯j − ∗i )Ψi(R− v¯j + ∗i )
r
Furthermore, for each R ∈ [0, v¯b+ v¯s], Γ̂i(R) = {Γi(R, ∗i ) : ∗i ∈ Φi(R)}.
Proof of Claim A.3. It is easy to show that equations 3 and 5 can be



















Ψi(R− vj)dFj + 2Ψi(Ri)Ψ′j(Rj),
(16)
where Rb = Vb+p∗i , Rs = Vs−p∗i , R = Rb+Rs and, for each x = b, s and for
any z ∈ <, Ψx(z) is define in (9). It follows immediately from the arguments
in the proof of Proposition 2 above that in any ME, the equilibrium posted
price p∗i is as follows:
p∗i =
{
Vs − v¯s + ∗b if i = b
v¯b − Vb − ∗s if i = s,
for some ∗i ∈ Φi(R), where Φi(R) is defined in Claim A.3. It thus follows
(from Proposition 1) that a ME can be characterized by a triple (Vb, Vs, ∗i )
which satisfies equations 15 and 16 with Rj = v¯j−∗i and Ri = R−v¯j+∗i , and
such that ∗i ∈ Φi(R). Substituting for Ri and Rj in (15) and (16) using these
latter expressions, it follows (by adding (15) and (16)) that R = Γi(R, ∗i ),
where Γi(R, ∗i ) is defined in Claim A.3. Hence, (Vb, Vs, p
∗
i ) defines a ME
only if R(= Vb + Vs) is a fixed point of Γ̂i, where the correspondence Γ̂i is
defined in Claim A.3. This, then, establishes Claim A.3.
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix an arbitrary ME. In order to emphasize
the dependence of the sum of the equilibrium payoffs to a pair of agents of
the opposite types on the discount rate, we write it as R(r). Now consider
two arbitrary values of the discount rate, rH > rL. We need to show that
R(rL) > R(rH). We argue by contradiction. Thus, suppose, to the contrary,
that R(rL) ≤ R(rH). It follows from equation (10) — since for any R, ξ(R; r)
is strictly decreasing in r — that therefore rHVj(rH) < rLVj(rL). But this
implies that Vj(rH) < Vj(rL), which, in turn, implies that Vi(rH) < Vi(rL).
Hence, it follows that R(rH) < R(rL), which contradicts our supposition.
29A proof is available upon request.
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We now show that R→ v¯b + v¯s as r → 0. In the limit as r → 0, the LHS
of (10) converges to zero, and hence, the RHS must also converge to zero.
This implies that in the limit as r → 0,∫∫
vb+vs≥R
[vb + vs −R]dFbdFs
must converge to zero. Hence, R must converge to v¯b + v¯s.
We now show that R→ 0 as r →∞. After dividing equation 10 by r, it
follows that in the limit as r →∞, it must be the case that Vj/k + Vi → 0.
Hence, R→ 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof of Part (a)
Here we establish the existence of a ME by allowing agents of type i
to randomize over their choice of the posted price. This existence result
only requires that both Fb and Fs are continuous, which allows us to use
the Theorem of the Maximum, from which it follows that Φi(.) is compact
valued and upper hemi-continuous (uhc), where Φi is defined in Claim A.3
above.
A type i agent randomizes over two prices — that is, over two values of
∗i . The value of 
∗
i is realized after he encounters an agent of the opposite
type but before the match-specific values are realized. A randomization is
a triple (∗i1, 
∗
i2, pi) where p is the probability with which 
∗
i1 is selected.
From the definition and derivation of Gi(;R) — which is provided in the
proof of Proposition 2 — it should be clear that the amended problem for
the type i agent is now to pick (i1, i2, pi) from [0, v¯i + v¯j − R]2 × [0, 1] to
maximize piGi(i1;R) + (1 − pi)Gi(i2;R). Hence, the optimal pair ∗i1 and
∗i2 can be chosen arbitrarily from Φi(R). Given this choice, pi
∗ is arbitrary.
Amending (15) and (16) to allow for randomizations, and then adding
them implies that in equilibrium R ∈ Λ(R), where
Λ(R) = {γ : γ = pimin{Γ̂i(R)}+(1−pi)max{Γ̂i(R)} for some pi ∈ [0, 1]}.
Because Γi(R, .) is continuous, Γ̂i(.) is compact valued and uhc. Hence,
Λ : [0, v¯i + v¯j ] → [0, v¯i + v¯j ] is compact valued, convex valued and uhc.
An equilibrium is fully characterized as a fixed point of Λ. This is be-
cause any R∗ ∈ Γ(R∗) identifies a randomization {∗i1, ∗i2, pi∗} such that
Γi(R∗, ∗i1) = min{Γ̂i(R∗)} and Γi(R∗, ∗i2) = max{Γ̂i(R∗)} and pi = [R∗ −
min{Γ̂(R∗)}]/[max{Γ̂(R∗)} − min{Γ̂(R∗)}], which is consistent with type
i agents’ optimal behaviour at R = R∗. Given this randomization, the
threshold value for the sum of the match specific preference shocks, vi + vj ,
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at which trade occurs is exactly R∗. Existence of a ME is now a consequence
of Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem.
Proof of Part (b)
In order to establish this part of the proposition, we shall make use of the
characterization of the set of ME given in Claim A.3 above.
It is straightforward to show that when Fi is degenerate, the expression
for Gi(;R) defined in Claim A.3 reduces to:
Gi(;R) = −(v∗i + v¯j − −R)Ψ′j(v¯j − )−Ψj(v¯j − ).
Hence, if Fj is differentiable then the derivative of Gi with respect to ,
(17) G′i(;R) = (v
∗
i + v¯j − −R)Ψ′′j (v¯j − ) + 2Ψ′j(v¯j − ).
It follows from Claim A.1 above that for any ∗i ∈ Φi(R), it must be the
case that 0 < ∗i < v¯b + v¯s − R. Hence, it follows that ∗i ∈ Φi(R) only if
G′i(
∗
i ;R) = 0. It thus follows immediately from (17) that 
∗
i ∈ Φi(R) only
if ∗i is a solution to the following equation in  (where  ∈ [0, v∗i + v¯j −R]):
(18) v∗i + v¯j − −R = −
2Ψ′j(v¯j − )
Ψ′′j (v¯j − )
.
Notice that the left-hand side of (18) is strictly decreasing in  over the closed
interval [0, v∗i + v¯j−R] — taking a strictly positive value at  = 0, and taking
a value of zero when  = v∗i + v¯j − R. Over the same closed interval, log-
concavity of 1−Fj implies that the right-hand side is increasing from zero to
a strictly positive number. Hence, there exists a unique solution in  to (18).
It is thus follows that this unique solution constitutes the unique element
of Φi(R). Hence, Γ̂i is a function, and thus, R is a fixed point of Γ̂i if and
only if R = Γ̂i(R, ∗i (R)). That is, using (14) — after simplifying it using
the assumption that Fi is degenerate — if and only if R satisfies
(19) 2rR = (λi + λj)Ψj(R− v∗i )+
(λj − λi)[(v∗i + v¯j − ∗i (R)−R)Ψ′j(v¯j − ∗i (R)) + Ψj(v¯j − ∗i (R))].
We now establish that there exists a unique solution in R to the above
equation. Hence, it follows from Claim A.3 that there exists a unique ME.
The set of feasible values of R is the closed interval [0, v∗i + v¯j ]. The left-
hand side of (19) increases over this interval — taking the value of zero when
R = 0, and taking the value of 2r(v∗i + v¯j) when R = v
∗
i + v¯j . Differentiating
the right-hand side of (19) with respect to R yields
(λi+λj)Ψ′j(R−v∗i )−(λj−λi)
[
(v∗i + v¯j−∗i (R)−R)∗′i (R)Ψ′′j (v¯j−∗i (R))+
(2∗′i (R) + 1)Ψ
′
j(v¯j − ∗i (R))
]
.
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Then, using (18) this derivative reduces to
(λi + λj)Ψ′j(R− v∗i )− (λj − λi)Ψ′j(v¯j − ∗i (R)),
which is less than or equal to zero — since 0 ≤ ∗i (R) ≤ v∗i + v¯j − R.
Finally, note that at R = v∗i + v¯j , the right-hand side of (19) is zero — since
∗i (v
∗
i + v¯j) = 0. Hence, since both sides of (19) are continuous in R, there
exists a unique solution in R to (19).
Proof of Lemma 3. Under the restriction that λi = λj , equation








The lemma now follows immediately from this results.




















Given the comparative-static results on R derived above in the proof of
Lemma 3, and since (by the assumption that 1−Fj is log-concave) Ψ′j(Rj)/Ψ′′j (Rj)
is strictly increasing in Rj , it is straightforward to show that therefore Rj
is strictly decreasing in x. Hence, it follows that the derivative of τ with
respect to x is in general ambiguous.
Now suppose that v∗i + vj > 0. Once again, fix x = r̂, v
∗
i . It is straight-
forward to show from the equation that determines R — namely, r̂R =
Ψj(R− v∗i ) — that there exists a value of x — call it x¯ — such that for any
x > x¯, R − v∗i ≤ vj . Thus, for any x > x¯, the equilibrium probability of
trade γ = 1. Now note that since Rj is strictly decreasing in x (as shown
above), the equilibrium probability of trade at the posted price 1− Fj(Rj)
is strictly increasing in x. The appropriate results in Proposition 8 (when
v∗i + vj > 0) concerning the relationship between τ and x (for values of
x > x¯) now follow immediately.
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